Religious Accommodations and the Common Good by Hall, Mark David
Digital Commons @ George Fox University
Faculty Publications - Department of History,
Politics, and International Studies
Department of History, Politics, and International
Studies
2015
Religious Accommodations and the Common
Good
Mark David Hall
George Fox University, mhall@georgefox.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/hist_fac
Part of the American Politics Commons, Political Theory Commons, and the Religion Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History, Politics, and International Studies at Digital Commons @ George
Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications - Department of History, Politics, and International Studies by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox University. For more information, please contact arolfe@georgefox.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hall, Mark David, "Religious Accommodations and the Common Good" (2015). Faculty Publications - Department of History, Politics,
and International Studies. Paper 52.
http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/hist_fac/52
Key Points
Religious Accommodations and the Common Good
Mark David Hall, PhD
 n Historically, there has been a 
broad consensus among Ameri-
cans that religious actors should 
be protected against otherwise 
valid laws unless the state has a 
compelling interest. This consen-
sus may be unraveling.
 n Religious liberty is a core Ameri-
can principle. Many accommo-
dations have been passed with 
significant bipartisan support, 
and both conservative and liberal 
jurists have supported judicially 
created accommodations.
 n The national and state govern-
ments often create accommoda-
tions to protect religious indi-
viduals from neutral, generally 
applicable laws, but this does not 
exhaust the state’s interest in pro-
tecting religious citizens and does 
not prevent states from achieving 
important policy objectives.
 n Legislators have passed laws to 
protect religious citizens from 
discrimination by both private 
and governmental entities.
 n As the nation and the states 
address new threats to what 
the Founders called “the sacred 
rights of conscience,” they 
should consider past lessons as 
they make laws and policies. 
Abstract
Citizens, civic leaders, and jurists interested in good public policy 
should look to history as a guide to the impact of laws and constitu-
tional provisions aimed at protecting religious actors. American civic 
leaders and jurists, at both the national and state levels, have long cre-
ated significant protections for religious Americans who object to neu-
tral, generally applicable laws. At their best, Americans have agreed 
that government should not force individuals to violate their sincerely 
held religious convictions unless it has compelling reasons for doing so. 
Moreover, the nation and the states have still been able to achieve im-
portant policy objectives in spite of these accommodations. America’s 
laudable history of protecting religious citizens from otherwise valid 
laws makes it clear not only that it is possible to protect “the sacred 
rights of conscience” and promote the common good, but also that reli-
gious accommodations themselves promote the common good.
America has a long history of accommodating citizens who findtheir religious convictions at odds with government regulations 
and mandates. Starting in the colonial era, legislators, statesmen, 
and jurists have crafted accommodations to protect people of faith 
from neutral, generally applicable laws that nevertheless burden the 
free exercise of religion even in such areas of extreme importance as 
national defense, education, drug use, health care, and civil rights.
the explosive growth of government at both the state and 
national levels in the 20th century has made accommodations even 
more important for protecting religious actors. because religious 
liberty has been highly valued by both Democrats and republicans, 
legislatures have routinely crafted accommodations 
to protect religious individuals. by one count from the 
early 1990s, there were approximately 2,000 federal 
or state laws that accommodated religious citizens.1
In virtually all of these cases, there is little evidence 
that these accommodations have harmed other 
individuals or kept either the states or the nation 
from meeting significant policy objectives. America’s 
laudable history of protecting religious citizens from 
otherwise valid laws makes it clear not only that it is 
possible to protect “the sacred rights of conscience” 
and promote the common good, but also that religious 
accommodations themselves promote the common good.
Why Accommodations?
Virtually every civic leader in the American 
Founding agreed that governments, in the words of 
James Madison, should not compel “men to worship 
God in any manner contrary to their conscience.”2 by 
the late 20th century, it was a rare legislative body 
that would even consider explicitly dictating or ban-
ning a religious practice.
In one of these extraordinary cases, the town of 
Hialeah, Florida, banned the slaughter of animals 
in religious ceremonies but not for other purposes. 
Members of the church of Santeria, whose religious 
practices include animal sacrifices, were prosecuted 
under this statute. In 1993, the Supreme court of the 
United States held unanimously that the law violated 
the Free exercise clause of the First Amendment.3
For at least the past 60 years, the chief threats 
to religious liberty in America have come instead 
from general laws or policies aimed at advancing 
the common good that unintentionally burden 
religious actors. these statutes rarely mention 
specific religions or religious practices, but they 
nonetheless prevent certain citizens from acting on 
their religious convictions (or make it very costly 
for them to do so).
For example, a state may determine that beards 
could be used to conceal contraband or to help 
prisoners escape and so ban inmates from grow-
ing them. Yet this neutral, generally applicable rule 
would keep Muslim prisoners who believe that their 
faith requires them to grow beards from following 
the dictates of their religion. What should be done? 
One possibility would be to abolish the regulation 
altogether, but assuming that the policy advances 
its intended goals, such a solution detracts from the 
common good. Alternatively, the religious convic-
tions of Muslim prisoners could simply be ignored.
For at least the past 60 years, the 
chief threats to religious liberty in 
America have come from general laws 
or policies aimed at advancing the 
common good that unintentionally 
burden religious actors.
At their best, Americans have opted for a third 
way. In this situation, many states voluntarily cre-
ated accommodations to allow prisoners to grow 
very short beards if required to do so by their faith.4 
Arkansas did not, but the U.S. Supreme court ruled 
unanimously that congress’s religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 required 
such an outcome.5 One major purpose of this act, 
which was passed without objection in both hous-
es of congress, was to ensure that the religious 
convictions of prisoners were accommodated 
whenever possible.
Of course, not all religious practices should be 
accommodated. religious liberty is not an abso-
lute trump card that empowers citizens to disre-
gard laws. State and national governments there-
1. James E. Ryan, “Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment,” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 6 
(September 1992), p. 1445.
2. Daniel L. Dreisbach and Mark David Hall, eds., The Sacred Rights of Conscience: Selected Readings on Religious Liberty and Church–State Relations 
in the American Founding (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Press, 2009), p. 427.
3. Justice Anthony Kennedy did note in his majority opinion that a law banning a religious practice would be constitutional if “it is justified by a 
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 
(1993). It is difficult to find contemporary examples of such a statute, although one possibility might be Kentucky’s law against handling “any 
kind of reptile in connection with any religious service.” Revised Statutes of Kentucky, 437.060.
4. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner in Holt v. Hobbes, May 2014, pp. 28–29.
5. Holt v. Hobbes, 574 U.S. ___ (2015).
fore have sometimes refused to protect religious 
citizens, or have even withdrawn protections when 
they determine that the actions in question are 
extremely damaging to the common good. In 1878, 
for instance, the Supreme court refused to recog-
nize a First Amendment right to engage in polyga-
my for religious reasons,6 and in the 20th century, 
many states first accommodated parents who had 
religious objections to providing medical treatment 
for their children and then abolished these accom-
modations as it became evident that children were 
dying from illnesses that medical advances had 
rendered easily treatable.
Ultimately, there is no theoretical answer to the 
question of which actions dictated by religious con-
victions should be protected and which should not. 
this is a practical question to be decided prudentially 
on a case-by-case basis. In deliberating about any 
such case, civic leaders and jurists must balance a 
concern for securing the common good with a mind-
fulness of the duties that citizens have to God and the 
importance of allowing them to discharge them. civic 
friendship would also suggest that religious objec-
tors be accommodated so long as doing so does not 
imperil the common good.7
In the later part of the 20th century, the Supreme 
court developed a framework for thinking through 
how to accommodate religious objectors to gen-
eral laws. In 1963, under the leadership of liberal 
Justice William J. brennan, the court adopted the 
principle that government actions that burden a 
religious practice must be justified by a compelling 
state interest.8 Later, the court added the require-
ment that this interest must be pursued in the least 
restrictive manner possible.
In other words, citizens should not be forced 
to violate their religious beliefs unless necessary. 
Whenever possible, an accommodation should be 
found. Although this test was developed to help 
jurists interpret the First Amendment’s Free exer-
cise clause, it is also a useful guide for legislatively 
crafted accommodations.9
Civic leaders and jurists must balance 
a concern for securing the common 
good with a mindfulness of the 
duties that citizens have to God and 
the importance of allowing them to 
discharge them.
When a majority of Supreme court Justices 
repudiated this test with respect to interpreting the 
Free exercise clause in the 1990 case of Oregon v. Smith 
(involving the use of an illegal drug in religious rituals), 
congress enacted the religious Freedom restoration 
Act (rFrA) of 1993 to restore it.10 It is noteworthy that 
the bill was passed in the House without a dissenting 
vote, was approved 97 to 3 by the Senate, and was 
signed into law by President bill clinton.
rFrA stipulates that “Government shall not sub-
stantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even 
if the burden results from a rule of general applica-
bility” except “if it demonstrates that application 
of the burden to the person” is “in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest” and “is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling gov-
ernmental interest.”11
6. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
7. On similar grounds, one could argue for the protection of non-religious convictions that are at odds with the law. Legislatures and courts have 
become better at doing this, but historically, religion has been specially protected in America.
8. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9. There is an extensive scholarly debate over whether America’s Founders intended the Free Exercise Clause to require accommodations. See, 
for instance, Michael W. McConnell, “The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 103, 
No. 7 (May 1990), pp. 1409–1517; Philip A. Hamburger, “A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective,” George 
Washington Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 4 (April 1992), pp. 915–948; Ellis M. West, “The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in Early America: 
The Case of Conscientious Objectors to Conscription,” Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 367–401; and Douglas 
Laycock, “The Religious Exemption Debate,” Rutgers Journal of Law & Religion, Vol. 11, Part 1 (Fall 2009), pp. 152–154. For reasons of space, this 
essay does not enter into this debate.
10. See Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). This case and its aftermath are discussed in 
more detail below.
11. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Public Law 103-141, November 16, 1993, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/
legacy/2014/07/24/act-pl103-141.pdf (accessed October 22, 2015).
the law was meant to apply to all levels of gov-
ernment, but in 1996, the Supreme court ruled that 
it could not be applied to the states. In response, 21 
states have enacted rFrA laws of their own.12
Historically, there has been a broad consensus that 
religious actors should be protected against otherwise 
valid laws unless the state has a compelling interest. 
Alas, this consensus may be unraveling. robert P. 
George, of Princeton University, observed in 2012 that 
there is “a massive assault on religious liberty going on 
in this country right now.”13 Although most civic leaders 
and jurists remain committed to religious liberty in 
the abstract, support for protecting citizens from 
neutral laws that infringe upon religious convictions 
has deteriorated.14
For instance, at the national level, the Obama 
Administration showed little concern for religious 
liberty when it required businesses to provide con-
traceptives and abortifacients to employees even 
though they had religious convictions against doing 
so. It also offered a rare challenge to the doctrine 
of ministerial exception, a legal protection which 
holds that religious groups should be free to choose, 
in the words of chief Justice John roberts, “who 
will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry 
out their mission.”15 In both instances, the Supreme 
court rebuffed the Administration and protected 
religious actors.16
At the state level, over the past several years, some 
small-business owners who have religious objections 
to participating in same-sex marriage ceremonies have 
been prosecuted for declining to do so. courts in these 
states have given little weight to arguments that the 
religious liberty provisions of state or national constitu-
tions offer these photographers, florists, and bakers any 
protection.17 In 2015, Indiana and Arkansas considered 
bills similar to the national rFrA, at least in part to 
help protect such citizens, a virtual firestorm erupted.
Although most civic leaders and jurists 
remain committed to religious liberty 
in the abstract, support for protecting 
citizens from neutral laws that 
infringe upon religious convictions 
has deteriorated.
In the academy, professors Marci Hamilton and 
brian Leiter, among others, have made well-publi-
cized arguments that religious citizens should sel-
dom, if ever, be exempted from generally applicable 
laws.18 On the legal front, others have contended that 
religious accommodations (or at least some of them) 
violate the establishment clause.19 With a few minor 
12. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Other states have not enacted such laws, in some cases because courts in these states continue to 
interpret their state constitutions to require strict scrutiny of laws restricting religious activities. For a helpful compilation of state RFRAs, see 
National Conference of State Legislatures, “State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts,” June 5, 2015, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx (accessed September 1, 2015).
13. Quoted in Brian Tashman, “Robert George Warns of Obama’s ‘Massive Assault on Religious Liberty,’” People for the American Way, Right 
Wing Watch, February 15, 2012, http://www.rightwingwatch.org/content/robert-george-warns-obamas-massive-assault-religious-liberty 
(accessed September 1, 2015).
14. See American Civil Liberties Union, “Using Religion to Discriminate,” https://www.aclu.org/feature/using-religion-discriminate 
(accessed September 1, 2015), and Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Protect Thy Neighbor, “Protecting Our Neighbors,” 
http://www.protectthyneighbor.org/ (accessed September 1, 2015).
15. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012).
16. Ibid. and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
17. See, for instance, Elane Photography, L.L.C v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, 309 P.3d 53 (concerning a photographer in New Mexico); In the 
Matter of Melissa Elaine Klein, Interim Order, Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries, Case Nos. 44-14 and 45-14, January 29, 2015 
(concerning bakers in Oregon); and State of Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, No. 13-2-008715, February 18, 2015 (concerning a florist in 
Washington State).
18. Marci A. Hamilton, God vs. the Gavel: Religion and the Rule of Law, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), and Brian Leiter, 
Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).
19. See, for instance, Frederick Mark Gedicks and Rebecca G. Van Tassell, “RFRA Exceptions from the Contraception Mandate: An 
Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion,” Harvard Civil Rights–Civil Liberties Law Review, Vol. 49, Issue 2 (Summer 2014), pp. 343–384.
exceptions,20 the Supreme court has regularly reject-
ed this argument, and legislators have seldom found 
it persuasive.
citizens, civic leaders, and jurists interested in 
good public policy should look to history as a guide 
to the impact of laws and constitutional provisions 
aimed at protecting religious actors. this essay 
shows that American civic leaders and jurists, at 
both the national and state levels, have long creat-
ed significant protections for religious Americans 
who object to neutral, generally applicable laws. 
consideration of a range of policy areas reveals 
that Americans, at their best, have agreed that gov-
ernments should not force individuals to violate 
their sincerely held religious convictions unless 
they have compelling reasons for doing so. More-
over, the nation and the states have still been able 
to achieve important policy objectives in spite of 
these accommodations.
Military Service
Among the government’s many roles, few are as 
important as national security. Virtually no one dis-
putes that governments have an obligation to protect 
their citizens from external threats. In the modern 
era, states and nations have regularly relied upon 
compulsory militia service or conscription to raise 
armies. religious pacifists often ask to be excused 
from such service, but some countries have rejected 
their pleas.
Most American colonies required adult males 
to serve in the militia. Members of the Society of 
Friends, better known as Quakers, were often pac-
ifists who refused to do so. As early as the 1670s, 
they requested to be excused from military service. 
rhode Island, North carolina, and Maryland grant-
ed their requests, provided these pacifists paid a fine 
or hired a substitute.21
Many colonies followed their example in the 18th 
century, often expanding accommodations to include 
other religious pacifists. During the War for Indepen-
dence, the continental congress supported these accom-
modations with the following July 18, 1775, resolution:
As there are some people, who, from religious 
principles, cannot bear arms in any case, this 
congress intend no violence to their consciences, 
but earnestly recommend it to them, to contrib-
ute liberally in this time of universal calamity, to 
the relief of their distressed brethren in the sev-
eral colonies, and to do all other services to their 
oppressed country, which they can consistently 
with their religious principles.22
Fourteen years later, during the debates in the 
First Federal congress over the bill of rights, James 
Madison proposed a version of what became the 
Second Amendment that stipulated that “no person 
religiously scrupulous, shall be compelled to bear 
arms.”23 Although largely forgotten today, this provi-
sion provoked almost as much recorded debate as the 
First Amendment’s religion provisions. James Jack-
son, a representative from Georgia, insisted that if 
such an accommodation was made, then those accom-
modated should be required to hire a substitute.
According to newspaper accounts, connecticut’s 
roger Sherman objected that it “is well-known that 
those who are religiously scrupulous of bearing 
arms, are equally scrupulous of getting substitutes or 
paying an equivalent; many of them would rather die 
than do either one or the other.” Sherman, however, 
did not see an absolute necessity for a clause of this 
kind. “We do not live under an arbitrary government,” 
he said, “and the states respectively will have the 
government of the militia, unless when called into 
actual service.”24 Sherman was sympathetic to the 
20. For instance, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). In this essay, I mention a number of cases in which accommodations 
have not been held to violate the Establishment Clause, including two decided as late as 2015. For further discussion, see Laycock, “The 
Religious Exemption Debate,” pp. 152–154, and Carl H. Esbeck, “Third-Party Burdens, Congressional Accommodations for Religion, and the 
Establishment Clause,” testimony before the Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of 
Representatives, February 13, 2015, http://clsnet.org/document.doc?id=829 (accessed September 1, 2015).
21. Michael W. McConnell, “The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 103, No 7 (1990), 
p. 1468.
22. Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1779 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1906), Vol. 5, 
p. 189.
23. Quoted in Mark David Hall, Roger Sherman and the Creation of the American Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 139.
24. Ibid.
plight of pacifists, but he preferred to rely on state and 
federal legislatures to protect them rather than make 
it a constitutional principle.
Madison’s proposal was approved by the House 
but rejected by the Senate and thus did not make 
it into the final text of what would become the Sec-
ond Amendment. Madison and Sherman returned 
to the issue two months later when representatives 
debated a bill regulating the militia when called into 
national service. Madison offered an amendment to 
protect from militia service “persons conscientious-
ly scrupulous of bearing arms.”
It is the glory of our country, said he, that a more 
sacred regard to the rights of mankind is preserved, 
than has heretofore been known. the Quaker mer-
its some attention on this delicate point, liberty 
of conscience: they had it in their own power to 
establish their religion by law, they did not. He 
was disposed to make the exception gratuitous, 
but supposed it impracticable.25
Sherman immediately supported Madison’s 
amendment, arguing that:
[t]he exemption of persons conscientiously scru-
pulous of bearing arms [is] necessary and proper. 
He was well convinced that there was no pos-
sibility of making such persons bear arms, they 
would rather suffer death than commit what 
appeared to them a moral evil—though it might 
happen that the thing itself was not a moral evil; 
yet their opinion served them as proof. As to their 
being obliged to pay an equivalent, gentlemen 
might see that this was as disagreeable to their 
consciences as the other, he therefore thought it 
advisable to exempt them as to both at present.26
the amended bill eventually was passed, although 
with the requirement that conscientious objectors 
must hire a substitute.27
Few men were as influential in crafting the U.S. 
constitution and bill of rights as Madison and Sher-
man. their commitment to protecting religious citi-
zens in this situation is surely noteworthy even if the 
practical concerns that such accommodations could 
undermine national security are understandable. 
throughout the 19th century, states often accom-
modated religious pacifists by permitting them to 
hire a substitute or pay a fine instead of performing 
military service.
because states were the main source of soldiers for 
America’s wars into the 20th century, religious paci-
fists were well, if not perfectly, protected. the nation’s 
first conscription law in the 20th century, the Selec-
tive Draft Act of 1917, exempted from combat service 
members of “any well-recognized religious sect or 
organization at present organized and existing whose 
creed or principles forbid its members to participate 
in war in any form.”28 Instead of fighting, Quakers, 
Mennonites, brethren, and members of other his-
toric peace churches were required to perform non-
combat duties. If they refused to do so, which some 
did as a matter of conscience, they were jailed.
A serious objection to the religious accommoda-
tion in the Selective Draft Act of 1917 is that it pro-
tected members of historic peace churches but not 
pacifists from other traditions. In 1918, the Supreme 
court rejected the argument that this violated the 
establishment clause in Arver v. United States.29 
to the relief of other religious pacifists, congress 
broadened the accommodation in the Selective 
training and Service Act of 1940 to include any-
one “who, by reason of religious training and belief, 
is conscientiously opposed to participation to war 
in any form.”30 congress rejected arguments that 
non-religious pacifists should be accommodated 
as well and in 1948 defined the phrase “religious 
training and belief” to mean “an individual’s belief 
in a relation to a Supreme being involving duties 
superior to those arising from any human rela-
tions, but [not including] essentially political, soci-
25. Ibid., p. 145 (emphasis added).
26. Ibid., pp. 144–145.
27. Ibid., p. 145.
28. Robert Miller and Ronald Flowers, Towards Benevolent Neutrality: Church, State, and the Supreme Court, 5th ed. 
(Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 1996), Vol. 2, p. 642.
29. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
30. Miller and Flowers, Towards Benevolent Neutrality, Vol. 2, p. 644.
ological, or philosophical views or merely personal 
moral code.”31
the exercise of religion is specially protected by 
the United States constitution, and it is not unrea-
sonable for congress or state legislatures to accom-
modate religious citizens. Yet it is also reasonable to 
insist that non-religious individuals who have similar 
convictions be given similar accommodations. con-
gress has refused to do this with respect to military 
service, but the Supreme court effectively read the 
Selective Service Act to require such accommoda-
tions in United States v. Seeger32 and Welsh v. United 
States.33 to this day, however, the U.S. code limits 
conscientious objector status to religious pacifists:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed 
to require any person to be subject to combatant 
training and service in the armed forces of the 
United States who, by reason of religious training 
and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participa-
tion in war in any form. As used in this subsection, 
the term “religious training and belief” does not 
include essentially political, sociological, or philo-
sophical views, or a merely personal moral code.34
Not every religious conviction should be accom-
modated, and it is worth noting that congress never 
created an accommodation for selective conscien-
tious objectors (individuals who object to a particular 
war but not all wars). In Gillette v. United States,35 the 
Supreme court ruled that the Free exercise clause 
did not require an accommodation for such citizens. 
Similarly, congress and the Supreme court have 
refused to exempt religious pacifists from paying the 
portion of their taxes that supports the military.36
the United States has a significant interest in 
ensuring that personnel needs are met during time of 
war and that the burdens of conscription are shared 
fairly. the military’s needs were severely stretched 
in World War I and World War II, yet congress saw 
fit to exempt religious pacifists from military service, 
and America, along with her allies, was able to win 
both conflicts. Personnel needs were met more eas-
ily in the Korean and Vietnam Wars as the nation 
was far from full mobilization. If the United States 
did not win these wars, it was not due to accommo-
dations granted to religious pacifists.
Swearing Oaths
Historically, oaths have been seen as essential 
for ensuring the loyalty and fidelity of citizens and 
elected officials. they were also viewed as critically 
important for the effective functioning of judicial 
systems. In his famous Farewell Address, President 
George Washington wrote that:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to polit-
ical prosperity, religion and morality are indisput-
able supports…. A volume could not trace all their 
connections with private and public felicity. Let it 
simply be asked where is the security for property, 
for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obli-
gation desert the oaths, which are the instruments 
of investigation in courts of Justice?37
In the christian West, oaths usually invoke God 
as the witness of the oath taker’s veracity; written 
oaths often end with the phrase “so help me God.” 
the state obviously has an interest both in the loy-
alty of its citizens and elected officials and in having 
a reliable judicial system.
Members of the Society of Friends objected to the 
taking of oaths as early as the 1650s. Simply put, they 
took (and take) literally such biblical passages as Mat-
thew 5:33–5:37, where Jesus says: “Swear not at all…. 
but let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for 
whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.”
In england, Quakers were routinely jailed for 
failing to swear oaths in courts or, after the revolu-
tion of 1688, to take oaths promising loyalty to the 
new regime. In the 1690s, Parliament agreed to let 
Quakers offer an “affirmation” rather than an oath 
31. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 645.
32. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
33. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
34. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j).
35. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
36. U.S. v. American Friends Service Committee, 419 U.S. 7 (1974).
37. Dreisbach and Hall, The Sacred Rights of Conscience, p. 468 (emphasis in original).
in some cases, but they still faced numerous dis-
abilities. For instance, they were not permitted to 
be witnesses in criminal cases or to hold civic offic-
es because of their unwillingness to take oaths. In 
addition to Quakers, many Moravians, Mennonites, 
and brethren in christ have religious objections to 
taking oaths.
the lot of Quakers and other groups who refused 
to take oaths varied widely in early America. As one 
might expect, Pennsylvania, which was founded 
by the Quaker William Penn, routinely permitted 
citizens to affirm rather than swear. Other colonies, 
including Massachusetts, Maryland, and Virginia, 
banned Quakers altogether and certainly did not 
tolerate their refusal to take oaths. However, due to 
Parliament’s 1689 Act of toleration, colonies were 
forced to tolerate Quakers and even to accommodate 
their convictions. by 1710, all of the American colo-
nies allowed Quakers to reside within their borders, 
and many had begun to permit them to use affirma-
tions instead of oaths. New York permitted Quakers 
to testify by affirmation in civil cases in 1691, and 
other colonies adopted similar or broader accom-
modations, including Maryland (1702); New Jersey 
(1722); and even Massachusetts (1743).38
by the Founding era, all states permitted Quak-
ers and other religious minorities to affirm rather 
than swear, although many states retained the lan-
guage of “so help me God” when stipulating how an 
oath or affirmation was to be taken. the most lib-
eral accommodation was found in rhode Island, 
which permitted officeholders to swear or affirm 
but in some cases gave officials the option of saying 
“this affirmation I make and give upon the peril of 
the penalty of perjury.”39 Presumably, this was to 
accommodate atheists and others who did not want 
to say “so help me God.”
It is important to note that the Act of toleration, 
which initially had forced American colonies to tol-
erate Quakers, was no longer binding on the new 
American states. Moreover, Quakers were a minor-
ity in every state and had little political power any-
where in America after the mid-18th century.
the most famous oath accommodations from this 
era may be found in the United States constitution. 
Articles I, II, and VI permit individuals either to swear 
or to affirm. the best-known of these provisions is 
Article II, Section 1, which reads: “before he [the 
President] enter on the execution of his office, he shall 
take the following oath or affirmation: ‘I do solemn-
ly swear, (or affirm,) that I will faithfully execute….’” 
even more significant is Article VI’s requirement that 
Senators and representatives “and the members of 
the several State legislatures, and all executive and 
judicial officers, both of the United States and of the 
several States, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, 
to support this constitution.”
Of course, one does not need to be religious to 
take advantage of these provisions, but in the context 
in which they were written, there is little doubt that 
these accommodations were intended for Quakers and 
others who had religious objections to taking oaths.
there is no reason to believe that exempting 
Quakers and others from oath requirements has had 
a detrimental effect on the judicial system at either 
the state or national level. Nor is there evidence that 
these citizens have been less loyal to America than 
other groups. It is also worth noting that in the 18th 
century, many Quakers became very successful mer-
chants in part because they were known to be partic-
ularly trustworthy in spite of their unwillingness to 
take oaths.
Mandatory School Attendance
In the 19th century, civic leaders in many states 
advocated compulsory education laws and creation 
of public school systems. One motivation behind 
this movement was the desire for children to learn 
such basic skills as reading, writing, and arithmetic. 
today, there is broad agreement that education is one 
of the most important services provided by govern-
ment. Some critics of public schools argue that the 
government should fund private education as well, but 
virtually no one contends that states should revoke 
compulsory attendance laws or eliminate funding 
for education.
In addition to teaching basic skills, many 19th cen-
tury reformers wanted public education to help turn 
the large waves of immigrants into good, democratic, 
and Protestant Americans. When catholics object-
ed to requirements that they send their children to 
what were effectively Protestant schools, they were 
38. McConnell, “The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,” pp. 1467–1468.
39. John D. Cushing, ed., First Laws of the State of Rhode Island (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1983), pp. 142, 148, and passim.
charged with being “sectarian,” and Protestant civic 
leaders were not amused by catholic attempts to 
receive a share of state education funding.40
As biased as public schools tended to be toward Prot-
estantism in the 19th century, it was rare for states to 
require catholics and other dissenters to attend them. 
Oregon famously attempted to achieve such an out-
come by banning all private schools in 1922. Although 
the initiative did not specifically prohibit catholic 
schools, virtually every private school in the state at the 
time was roman catholic. In 1925, the U.S. Supreme 
court declared the law to be a violation of the right of 
parents to control their children’s education.41
Public schools became noticeably less Protes-
tant (or, for that matter, religious) with the advent 
of the Supreme court’s modern establishment 
clause jurisprudence. Notably, teacher-led prayer 
was declared to be unconstitutional in 1962,42 as 
was devotional bible reading in 1963.43 Parents who 
wanted to send their children to religious schools 
were free to do so, provided they could afford private 
school tuition. In some cases, states attempted to aid 
these schools, but much of this aid was declared to be 
unconstitutional in the 1970s and 1980s.44 because 
the licensing of private schools was often onerous 
and homeschooling was rare at this time, parents 
who desired a religious education for their children 
were often unable to provide one.
Included among these parents were a group of 
Amish who lived in New Glarus, Wisconsin. these 
families did not object to sending their children to 
public schools through the eighth grade, but they 
refused to send them to the public high school. 
Although Amish generally do not go to court to 
resolve disputes, an attorney acting on their behalf 
objected that the Free exercise clause required the 
state to exempt them from the state’s compulsory 
attendance law. In 1972, a unanimous Supreme court 
(with a partial dissent by Justice Douglas) agreed.45
States have a powerful interest in 
ensuring that children are educated. 
Yet since the early 1980s, they have 
been increasingly willing to craft 
exemptions from compulsory 
attendance laws.
Since 1972, states have liberalized their compulsory 
attendance laws and their regulation of private schools 
and homeschooling so that it is far easier to remove 
children from public schools. Moreover, the Supreme 
court has allowed states to increase aid to these schools, 
thus making them more affordable.46 these laws were 
changed for a complex set of reasons, but among them 
was the desire of legislators to accommodate citizens 
who desire a faith-based education for their children.
States have a powerful interest in ensuring that 
children are educated. Yet since the early 1980s, they 
have been increasingly willing to craft exemptions 
from compulsory attendance laws. because students 
educated at home or in private schools regularly out-
perform students in public schools, it seems reason-
able to conclude that such accommodations have not 
had a detrimental effect on the quality of education 
in these states.47
Laws Requiring “Religious” Acts
Since the advent of the Supreme court’s modern 
establishment clause jurisprudence in 1947, it has 
been almost impossible to think that a state would 
require individuals to support a religious institution 
40. Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 191–284.
41. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
42. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
43. Abington v Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
44. See, for instance, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); and School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 
U.S. 373 (1985).
45. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
46. See, for instance, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), which upheld Ohio’s school voucher program.
47. See, for instance, Joseph Murphy, Homeschooling in America: Capturing and Assessing the Movement (Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin, 2012); Henry 
Braun, Frank Jenkins, and Wendy Grigg, National Assessment of Educational Progress (2006), 
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pubs/studies/2006461.asp (accessed November 20, 2014).
or conduct a religious exercise. this, however, has 
not always been the case.
In the early American colonies, from north to 
south, many civic leaders believed that the state 
should favor a particular denomination and/or 
encourage christianity. States with established 
churches often required everyone, including non-
adherents, to fund them. thanks in part to Parlia-
ment’s Act of toleration, colonial governments began 
to craft accommodations that allowed dissenters to 
support their own churches rather than the estab-
lished church, but independence from Great britain 
opened the possibility that states could revoke these 
accommodations. Fortunately for religious dissent-
ers, by this time, even many supporters of establish-
ments had come to the conclusion that individuals 
should not be required to support churches to which 
they did not belong.48
For instance, Patrick Henry’s famous 1784 bill for 
establishing a Provision for teachers of the christian 
religion would have required individuals to support 
their own churches while exempting the Quakers and 
Mennonites (who objected to any state involvement) 
from this requirement. When connecticut revised 
its statutes in 1783, the state continued to favor the 
congregational church, but dissenting Protestants 
were permitted to direct their ecclesiastical taxes to 
their own churches (a provision that was unfair to 
non-Protestants, of which there were virtually none 
in the state, but useful to the Anglicans, baptists, and 
Quakers who resided there).49 In each case, support-
ers believed that establishments promoted the com-
mon good but were willing to accommodate most (if 
not all) religious dissenters.
Yet these accommodations did not satisfy all dis-
senters. Many believers considered supporting their 
clergy and houses of worship to be a religious duty. 
For the government to involve itself in such mat-
ters, even if the state merely required them to sup-
port their own churches, was considered by some to 
violate their right to religious liberty.50 eventually, 
debates on these matters were mooted when states 
voluntarily abolished their religious establishments.
Over the past 150 years, states have rarely passed 
statutes explicitly requiring individuals to partici-
pate in religious acts, but several states did so inad-
vertently as America headed into the Second World 
War. In order to promote national unity, a number 
of states passed laws requiring school children to 
salute and pledge allegiance to the American flag. 
Most Americans have no objection to these practic-
es, but Jehovah’s Witnesses believe that they violate 
the bible’s command not to worship graven images 
(e.g., exodus 20:4–5). In 1940, eight Justices ruled 
that the states’ interest in promoting national unity 
permitted them to override these objections.51
Religious liberty protects the ability 
of citizens to worship or not worship 
according to the dictates of their own 
consciences, not the consciences 
of others.
three years later, the court returned to this 
issue. In a stunning reversal, six Justices concluded 
that states could not compel Jehovah’s Witnesses 
to engage in these acts. In oft-quoted words, Justice 
robert H. Jackson averred:
the very purpose of a bill of rights was to with-
draw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of 
political controversy, to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and officials and to estab-
lish them as legal principles to be applied by the 
courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to 
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and 
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not 
be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome 
of no elections.52
48. Of course, many civic leaders had come to oppose establishments altogether. See, for instance, Dreisbach and Hall, The Sacred Rights of 
Conscience, pp. 250–252 and 307–313.
49. Ibid., pp. 252–253 and 246–247; Hall, Roger Sherman and the Creation of the American Republic, pp. 83–90.
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51. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
52. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
After considering the state’s interest in forcing 
students to salute the flag, Jackson concluded that:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional con-
stellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, national-
ism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith there-
in. If there are any circumstances which permit an 
exception, they do not now occur to us.53
Justice Jackson’s opinion relies on multiple provi-
sions from the bill of rights and can certainly be read 
to protect both religious and non-religious citizens, 
but his argument is particularly compelling with 
respect to state laws that command people to par-
ticipate in what they consider to be religious actions 
with which they disagree. that most Americans do 
not view saluting the flag and pledging allegiance to it 
as equivalent to worshiping a graven image was prop-
erly determined by the court to be completely irrele-
vant. religious liberty protects the ability of citizens 
to worship or not worship according to the dictates of 
their own consciences, not the consciences of others.
Laws Banning Alcohol and Drug Use
the abuse of alcohol and drugs has led to untold 
problems throughout American history. colonial 
Americans sought to regulate alcohol, and in the 19th 
century, a powerful movement arose to ban it alto-
gether. In 1919, the U.S. constitution was amended 
to prohibit alcohol. congress passed the Volstead 
Act the same year to implement this amendment. 
For our purposes, of particular interest is congress’s 
approach to the issue of sacramental wine.
Sensitive to traditional religious belief that wine 
should be used for the eucharist (also known as com-
munion) and other ceremonies, congress crafted an 
exemption to the Volstead Act. the language of title II, 
Section 6 of this law alludes to two major religious tra-
ditions but is broad enough to cover others. It begins:
Nothing in this title shall be held to apply to the 
manufacture, sale, transportation, importation, 
possession, or distribution of wine for sacramen-
tal purposes, or like religious rites…. No person 
to whom a permit may be issued to manufacture, 
transport, import, or sell wines for sacramental 
purposes or like religious rites shall sell, barter, 
exchange, or furnish any such to any person not 
a rabbi, minister of the gospel, priest, or an offi-
cer duly authorized for the purpose by any church 
or congregation, nor to any such except upon an 
application duly subscribed by him, which appli-
cation, authenticated as regulations may pre-
scribe, shall be filed and preserved by the seller.54
the text of the bill makes it clear that congress was 
committed to protecting religious beliefs held alike by 
large denominations (e.g., roman catholics) and small 
religious bodies (e.g., Jews) who believed that sacra-
mental wine should be used in religious ceremonies.55
Far more difficult for legislators and courts have 
been the claims of citizens who contend that the use 
of regulated substances is part of their religious prac-
tices. Particularly well-known is the case of Native 
Americans who use peyote in religious ceremo-
nies. Although peyote is a controlled substance, the 
national government recognized its legitimate use in 
“bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native Ameri-
can church” in 1966.56 Some states adopted similar 
accommodations, but Oregon did not.
In Oregon v. Smith, the Supreme court ruled that 
the First Amendment does not shield Native Ameri-
cans or others who use peyote in religious ceremonies 
from neutral, generally applicable laws. Shortly after 
Smith was decided, Oregon passed a statute protecting 
the right of individuals (not just Native Americans) to 
use peyote in religious ceremonies. In 1994, without 
any recorded objections, congress amended the Amer-
ican Indian religious Freedom Act to protect Native 
Americans in 22 states that did not permit Native 
Americans to use peyote in religious ceremonies.
53. Ibid., p. 642.
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56. 31 Fed. Reg. 4679 (1966); 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31.
As noted, the abuse of drugs and alcohol has 
caused a great deal of damage throughout American 
history. At different times and in different ways, the 
national and state governments have attempted to 
prohibit alcohol and certain drugs. there have been 
extensive debates about the efficacy of these endeav-
ors, but there is no reason to believe that accommo-
dations crafted by legislatures to permit the sac-
ramental use of wine, peyote, or other controlled 
substances57 by religious citizens have been detri-
mental to public health. From a historical perspec-
tive, these accommodations fit well with similar laws 
crafted to protect religious practitioners.
Laws Requiring Medical Treatment
traditionally, states and the national government 
have deferred to individuals and families to make their 
own medical decisions. As medical knowledge improved 
during the 19th century, it became evident that the 
decisions of some individuals could have an impact on 
others. Particularly contested in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries were laws mandating vaccinations.
Advocates of vaccinations contended that they 
are necessary both for the health of the individuals 
vaccinated and for the well-being of others. If some 
individuals and families refuse vaccinations, the 
argument went, others would suffer from the spread 
of disease. In 1905, the Supreme court ruled that the 
state’s interest in protecting the “health and safety of 
the people” was sufficiently weighty to override the 
liberty of citizens to refuse a vaccine.58
today, all 50 states have laws requiring specified vac-
cines for students. States usually require vaccination 
as a prerequisite to attending school, but every state 
except Mississippi, West Virginia, and california grants 
exemptions for parents who have religious convictions 
against immunizations. eighteen states also allow phil-
osophical exemptions for those who object to immuni-
zations because of personal, moral, or other beliefs.59
the health and safety of citizens is a vital state 
interest, yet there is little reason to believe that accom-
modating citizens who have religious objections to 
vaccinations has caused significant harm. However, 
a 2015 spike in measles cases in california linked to 
unvaccinated adults and children clearly caused some 
harm. In response to several outbreaks, state legisla-
tors revoked the religious and philosophical exemp-
tions to california’s vaccination requirement.60
reconsidering previously granted accommodations 
is certainly appropriate, but a better option might have 
been to remove only the philosophical exemption and 
make the religious one more difficult to obtain. this 
would have protected both the state’s interest in pub-
lic health and the religious liberty of the relatively few 
citizens who have sincere religious objections to vacci-
nation requirements. An added benefit is that it would 
prevent some families from withdrawing their children 
from schools to avoid the vaccination requirement.
As has been repeatedly stipulated, not all reli-
gious convictions should be accommodated. In the 
early to mid-20th century, followers of Mary baker 
eddy, commonly known as christian Scientists, lob-
bied successfully for exemptions from state laws that 
require parents to provide medical treatment for 
their children. tragically, hundreds of children died 
because of easily treatable diseases. As a result, many 
states properly repealed or revised their exceptions.61
Medical Providers
Perhaps the most contentious and difficult politi-
cal-moral-legal issue over the past half-century has 
been abortion. Large numbers of Americans con-
sider it tantamount to murder, whereas others insist 
that access to the procedure is a fundamental consti-
57. See, for instance, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (protecting the ability of members of the 
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tutional right. Some activists believe that the state 
or private employers should be able to force medi-
cal providers to perform abortions even if they have 
sincere religious beliefs against doing so. the advent 
of emergency contraceptives/abortifacients such as 
Plan b and Ella raise similar issues with respect to 
pharmacists filling prescriptions.
In 1973, shortly after Roe v. Wade was decided, con-
gress passed the church Amendment to protect health 
care professionals. the legislation prohibits any court 
or public official from using the receipt of federal aid 
to require a person or institution to perform an abor-
tion or sterilization contrary to their “religious beliefs 
or moral convictions.”62 the amendment also makes 
it illegal for health care organizations to discriminate 
against individuals who refuse to perform these pro-
cedures. In arguing in favor of these protections, Sena-
tor Frank church (D–ID) remarked that:
[N]othing is more fundamental to our national 
birthright than freedom of religion. religious belief 
must remain above the reach of secular authority. It 
is the duty of congress to fashion the law in such a 
manner that no Federal funding of hospitals, med-
ical research, or medical care may be conditioned 
upon the violation of religious precepts.63
Subsequent congresses expanded these protec-
tions. For instance, in 1996, congress passed the 
Danforth Amendment, according to which:
[t]he federal, state, and local governments [were 
prohibited] from discriminating against healthcare 
entities that refuse to (1) undergo abortion training, 
(2) provide such training, (3) perform abortions, or 
(4) provide referrals for training or abortions. Spe-
cifically, it protected doctors, medical students, and 
health training programs from being denied federal 
financial assistance, certifications, or licenses they 
would otherwise receive but for their refusal.64
While not limited to institutions that oppose 
these practices for religious reasons, there is little 
doubt that an important motivation behind this act 
was protecting religious actors.
It is noteworthy that many (but not 
all) states specify that their conscience 
clauses protect individuals who 
object to abortions on moral or 
religious grounds.
Like congress, numerous states protect health care 
providers who have objections to performing certain 
procedures. According to the National Abortion rights 
Action League (NArAL), “47 states and the District of 
columbia [have] passed laws that permit certain medi-
cal personnel, health facilities, and/or institutions to 
refuse to provide abortion care.”65 Only Alabama, New 
Hampshire, and Vermont do not have such laws.66
It is noteworthy that many (but not all) states 
specify that their conscience clauses protect individ-
uals who object to abortions on “moral or religious 
grounds.”67 Some of these statutes offer better pro-
tection for religious liberty than others, but overall, 
both the national and state governments have made 
significant efforts to protect the ability of health care 
professionals to act (or not act) according to their 
religious convictions in these policy areas.
Over the past 15 years, heated debates have aris-
en about various types of emergency contraception 
(ec). Some activists claim they merely prevent con-
ception, whereas others contend that they can cause 
62. Quoted in Robin Fretwell Wilson, “Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the Healthcare Context,” in Same Sex Marriage 
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abortions.68 Some health care providers who believe 
that ecs can cause abortions and thus end innocent 
human lives have refused to administer or fill pre-
scriptions for these drugs. With respect to pharmacies, 
some states permit individual pharmacists to refuse 
to fill these prescriptions as long as another pharma-
cist is available to do so. Others permit pharmacies 
themselves to refuse to carry such drugs (particularly 
relevant for small, family-owned pharmacies). cur-
rently, between 16 and 22 states (depending on how 
one interprets broadly worded statutes in six states) 
protect health care providers and/or pharmacists 
from having to provide ecs.69
A closely related issue concerns state and federal 
requirements that employers pay for various types 
of contraception, including ecs. Some employers 
have refused to provide health plans covering such 
drugs. States have moved to protect the conscienc-
es of such individuals and entities in different ways. 
According to NArAL, of the 28 states that require 
health insurance to cover controversial forms of 
contraception, 20 exempt employers from doing so 
if they have religious or moral convictions against 
these drugs.70
At the national level, acting under the authority 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable care Act 
of 2010 (the Affordable care Act), the Department 
of Health and Human Services mandated that busi-
nesses cover a range of contraceptive devices, includ-
ing ecs. religious denominations and houses of wor-
ship were exempted from these requirements, but 
other religious organizations were not.
In response to significant outcry, the Obama 
Administration issued regulations whereby insurance 
providers used by religious organizations would offer 
these drugs at no cost (in theory) to the religious orga-
nizations’ employees. Some religious organizations 
were satisfied by this approach, but others believed 
they were still complicit in wrongdoing. For-profit 
businesses received no such protection, but in 2014, 
the Supreme court held in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., that the religious Freedom restoration 
Act requires such an accommodation for a closely held 
for-profit corporation.71
Protecting religious actors who are 
licensed by the state to provide medical 
services is one of the most complicated 
policy areas in which religious citizens 
have been accommodated.
there is no denying that protecting religious 
actors who are licensed by the state to provide 
medical services is one of the most complicated 
policy areas in which religious citizens have been 
accommodated. In some instances, such as with ecs, 
even the basic effect of the drug is debated. even when 
it is not, the state’s interest in regulating the provision 
of medical care, which can involve issues of life and 
death, is undoubtedly high. these cases are further 
complicated because they raise equal protection 
issues and sometimes concern what the Supreme 
court has called a fundamental right to abortion. It 
is telling that in spite of these complications, the 
nation and many states have gone to great lengths to 
protect the moral and religious convictions of health 
care providers.
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time and experience may reveal that some of 
the accommodations mentioned in this section 
are harmful. Although some advocacy groups fear 
that these accommodations will lead to great harm, 
there has been little evidence that this is the case.72 
If substantial evidence arises that some of the 
policies mentioned in this section are detrimental 
to the well-being of patients, legislatures may 
have to rethink existing accommodations. If such 
evidence does not surface, however, legislatures 
in states without accommodations should move 
quickly to protect the religious liberty of all citizens 
more effectively.
Civil Rights Laws
As we have seen, the national and state governments 
often create accommodations to protect religious 
individuals from neutral, generally applicable laws, 
but such accommodations—and many more could 
be discussed—do not exhaust the state’s interest 
in protecting religious citizens. For instance, 
legislators have passed laws to protect religious 
citizens from discrimination by both private and 
governmental entities.
Most prominently, title VII of the civil rights 
Act of 1964, as amended, prohibits employers with 
more than 15 employees from (among other things) 
refusing to hire or firing someone because of their 
religion or religious practices. the statute also 
requires private businesses to make “reasonable 
accommodations” for their employees’ or poten-
tial employees’ sincerely held religious convictions 
unless the accommodation would create an undue 
hardship for the employer.73
religious Americans, especially religious minor-
ities, indisputably have benefited from this law. 
In 2014, for example, Samantha elauf, a Muslim 
woman who wore a headscarf for religious reasons 
applied for a job at the clothing store Abercrombie 
& Fitch but was not hired because her scarf violat-
ed the company’s dress code. Although she had not 
explicitly requested an exception from the dress 
policy at her job interview, the Supreme court ruled 
by a margin of eight to one that title VII “prohib-
its a prospective employer from refusing to hire an 
applicant in order to avoid accommodating a reli-
gious practice that it could accommodate without 
undue hardship.”74
Many Americans agree that employers should not 
be able to discriminate on the basis of religious prac-
tices such as wearing a headscarf, a yarmulke, or a 
turban. Yet the congress that passed title VII recog-
nized that some religious discrimination is acceptable 
and protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, 
it crafted an accommodation to title VII that permits 
religious institutions to make employment decisions 
on the basis of religion. Specifically, “a religious corpo-
ration, association, educational institution, or society” 
is exempt “with respect to the employment of individu-
als of a particular religion to perform work connected 
with the carrying on by such corporation, association, 
educational institution, or society of its activities.”75
As a result, the roman catholic church can insist 
that only faithful roman catholics run its hospitals, 
an evangelical college may require its employees to 
be committed evangelicals, and a Jewish social ser-
vice agency may decide to employ only orthodox 
Jews. to prohibit religious institutions from making 
such decisions, congress reasoned, would constitute 
a grave threat to religious liberty.76
today, it is not uncommon for activist organiza-
tions such as the American civil Liberties Union to 
contend that religious individuals and institutions 
should rarely be exempted from neutral, generally 
applicable laws.77 Fortunately, legislators in even the 
most secular of states often disagree. For instance, 
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before the Supreme court redefined marriage for the 
entire country, some states had passed statutes recog-
nizing same-sex marriage that also protected religious 
organizations from being compelled to participate in 
them if it violated their doctrine. Washington State’s 
law recognizing same-sex marriage stipulates that:
(4) …No state agency or local government may 
base a decision to penalize, withhold benefits 
from, or refuse to contract with any religious 
organization on the refusal of a person associ-
ated with such religious organization to solem-
nize or recognize a marriage under this section. 
(5) No religious organization is required to 
provide accommodations, facilities, advan-
tages, privileges, services, or goods related to 
the solemnization or celebration of a marriage. 
(6) A religious organization shall be immune from 
any civil claim or cause of action, including a claim 
pursuant to chapter 49.60 rcW, based on its refus-
al to provide accommodations, facilities, advantag-
es, privileges, services, or goods related to the sol-
emnization or celebration of a marriage.78
Washington State recognizes that it is unconscio-
nable to compel religious organizations to partici-
pate in or lend their resources to “celebrations” when 
doing so would violate their religious convictions.
One shortcoming of the Washington statute is that 
it does not protect small-business owners who have 
sincere religious convictions that likewise prevent 
them from participating in same-sex wedding cer-
emonies. they should also be protected by carefully 
crafted accommodations. As we have seen, govern-
ments regularly create such accommodations and still 
manage to meet important policy objectives.
Conclusion
religious liberty is a core American principle—not 
a Democratic or republican one. Many of the accom-
modations discussed in this essay were passed with 
significant bipartisan support. both conservative 
and liberal jurists have supported judicially created 
accommodations. As the nation and states address 
new threats to what the American Founders called 
“the sacred rights of conscience,” they should careful-
ly consider the lessons of the past as they make laws 
and policies for the future.
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